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 Differential Mortality by Income and Social Security Progressivity 
By Gopi Shah Goda, John B. Shoven and Sita Nataraj Slavov 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
There is a widespread belief that people with low lifetime labor income have higher age 
specific mortality and lower remaining life expectancies at age 60 or 65 than those with middle 
or high lifetime earnings.  Historically, there was very little evidence to either support or 
undermine this belief.  The evidence that did exist found mortality differences by current labor 
income which could not be easily translated to measures based on lifetime income due to reverse 
causality issues:  someone in poor health status is likely to have low current earnings as well as 
high mortality.  However, recently new estimates of the mortality gap by lifetime income and its 
trend over time have been produced.   
In this paper, we assess the implications of differential mortality by lifetime income for 
Social Security progressivity.  Social Security has a highly progressive formula to determine 
monthly benefits in that those with low lifetime earnings get a much higher replacement rate than 
those with high lifetime earnings.  For example, Social Security might replace 70 percent of 
earnings for someone with a full length career in the bottom quartile of the earnings distribution, 
but only 30 percent of earnings for someone in the top quartile.  The rationale for this pattern is 
that those in the higher earnings brackets presumably have more opportunities to accumulate 
pensions and private saving to help finance their retirement.   
However, the recent studies on the mortality gap by lifetime income suggest that at least 
some of this progressivity is counterbalanced by the longer average lifetimes experienced by 
higher lifetime income recipients of Social Security.  Because Social Security benefits are paid 
as a life annuity, groups with higher life expectancies have higher returns than those with lower 
life expectancies.   
  1The recent literature on differential mortality by lifetime income allow us to reassess the 
progressivity of Social Security by calculating internal rates of return and net present values for 
the program under assumptions of differential mortality.  We compare these measures of 
progressivity to the same measures calculated assuming all individuals experience average 
population mortality rates.  Under the assumption of constant mortality across lifetime income 
subgroups, the Social Security system is progressive regardless of the measure shown.  However, 
a good deal of the progressivity is undone or even reversed when differential mortality is taken 
into account.  The results are similar for both stylized earners at different points of the earnings 
distribution and actual workers’ earnings histories.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the literature on Social Security 
progressivity and differential mortality by income.  Section 3 describes the earnings and 
mortality data used, as well as the way that earnings histories and differential mortality estimates 
were developed from these data sources.  The methodology used to calculate internal rates of 
return and net present values is described in Section 4, and results are presented in Section 5.  
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
  A handful of studies have analyzed the relationship between mortality and Social 
Security progressivity.  Early studies include Aaron (1977), Steuerle and Bakija (1994) and 
Garrett (1995).  These studies calculate returns to Social Security for hypothetical workers and 
suggest that differential mortality reduces the amount of progressivity in Social Security.  More 
recent studies, including Coronado, Fullerton and Glass (2000) and Liebman (2001), examine the 
redistribution in Social Security more generally.  Coronado et al. (2000) proceed in several steps, 
  2reclassifying Social Security recipients by different measures of income and incorporating 
mortality probabilities that differ by income.  They conclude that the system is far less 
progressive than it first appears, and may even be regressive under certain assumptions.   
Liebman (2001) uses a microsimulation model to show that Social Security becomes less 
redistributive when mortality is assumed to differ by race and education.  Both of these more 
recent studies perform calculations for a data set of individual earning histories based on a 
combination of survey, administrative, and imputed data.  CBO (2006) makes the point that 
when disability and survivor benefits are taken into account, Social Security is more progressive 
than when only retirement benefits are considered. 
  Many of these studies use estimates of differential mortality from several decades ago.   
Garrett (1995) uses stylized earnings histories and mortality differentials estimated in the 1960s 
and 1970s in Kitagawa and Hauser (1973).  Coronado et al. (2000) apply a crude adjustment to 
mortality ratios based on mortality differentials by annual income.  The authors acknowledge 
that annual income may be lower due to illness preceding death, and that their estimates may be 
biased as a result of reverse causality.  However, the estimates they use from Rogot et al. (1992) 
were the best available estimates of differential mortality by income available at the time. 
  Recent research has produced new estimates of how mortality differs by lifetime income, 
as well as suggestive evidence that the mortality inequality by income has been growing over 
time (Singh and Siahpush (2006), Christia (2007), Waldron (2007), CBO (2008), Jemal et al. 
(2008), Duggan et al. (2006)).  These studies are broadly consistent in their conclusions, and are 
based on richer and more recent data than previous estimates of differential mortality.  In this 
study, we rely on estimates in Christia (2007) and Waldron (2007) as described in the following 
section to generate mortality probabilities that differ by measures of lifetime income.   
  33.  Data  
3.1  Mortality 
We begin with mortality data obtained by request from the Social Security 
Administration.  The data consists of cohort life tables that underlie the 2007 Trustees Report.  
For cohorts born in 1925 and later, Social Security provides projected mortality rates under three 
different alternatives (I, II, III).  The intermediate scenario, or Alternative II, is used in our 
analysis for cohorts born after 1925.   
Waldron (2007) provides estimates of odds ratios (the mortality rate of the bottom half of 
the income distribution relative to the mortality rate of the top half of the income distribution) for 
men in five cohorts, broken down into 5-year age groups between 60 and 89.  The measure of 
income used in Waldron (2007) is average non-zero earnings from age 45 to 55.  Waldron’s 
estimates are shown in bold in Table 1.  The first cell, for example, indicates that an individual 
between the ages of 60 and 64 in the bottom half of the lifetime income distribution has a 
probability of dying that is 1.27 times higher than an individual in the top half of the distribution.  
Note that for all cohorts, these odds ratios decline as individuals age.  In fact, mortality 
inequality disappears by the time the 1912-1915 birth cohort reaches ages 85-89 (the bottom half 
is even estimated as having a slightly lower mortality rate). 
  Waldron’s estimates end at the last observed age for each cohort – for example, while 
estimates are available through age 89 for the 1912-1915 cohort, they are only available through 
age 64 for the 1936-1938 cohort.  We perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation to estimate 
odds ratios for the remaining unobserved cohort/age group combinations.  First, for each cohort, 
we compute the difference in the observed odds ratio when moving from one age group to the 
next.  For example, for the 1912-1915 cohort, the odds ratio decreases by 0.03 when moving 
  4from the 60-64 age group to the 65-69 age group; it falls by 0.04 when moving from 65-69 to 70-
74.  For each age group, we then compute the average difference across cohorts.  For example, 
when moving from the 60-64 age group to the 65-69 age group, the average decline (across the 6 
cohorts for which we have observed odds ratios) in the odds ratio is 0.06.  We use the average 
decreases in the odds ratios to estimate odds ratios for the missing cohort/age groups.  In the case 
of the 1936-1938 cohort, the odds ratio is assumed to fall by 0.06 (from 1.84 to 1.78).  Thus, we 
assume that mortality inequality declines with age in a similar way for each cohort.  Our 
estimates are shown in italics. 
We develop a similar table for women by incorporating estimates from Cristia (2007), 
which suggest that there is less mortality inequality among women.  Cristia’s estimates suggest 
that a male aged 65-75 in the second quintile (which includes the 25
th percentile) has a mortality 
rate that is 1.14 times the average (for males in that age group), while a male aged 65-75 in the 
fourth quintile (which includes the 75
th percentile) has a mortality rate that is 0.94 times the 
average.  Thus, the odds ratio for the second quintile relative to the fourth is 1.21.  Similarly, a 
woman aged 65-75 in the second quintile has a mortality rate that is 1.11 times the average, 
while a woman aged 65-75 in the fourth quintile has a mortality rate that is 1.03 times the 
average.  The implied odds ratio for the second to fourth quintiles is 1.08.  The second/fourth 
quintile odds ratio for women is 88.9% of the second/fourth quintile odds ratio for men.  We 
assume the top half/bottom half odds ratios for women are 88.9% of the corresponding male 
odds ratios – these are shown in Table 2. 
In our simulations, we consider the mortality experience of four cohorts: 1915, 1923, 
1931, and 1939.  For these cohorts, we model inequality by using the odds ratios associated with 
the 1912-1915, 1920-1923, 1928-1931, and 1936-1938 respectively.  We construct age-specific 
  5mortality rates for the bottom half and top half in such a way that their ratio is equal to the 
relevant odds ratio from Tables 1 and 2, and their average is equal to the overall mortality rate 
from the Social Security Administration’s cohort life table.  For individuals above age 89, we 
apply the odds ratios for ages 85-89.  For individuals aged 20-59, we apply the odds ratios for the 
60-64 age group.  Cristia’s (2007) results suggest that mortality inequality is even higher among 
age groups below the age of 60.  Thus, applying the 60-64 odds ratios to younger age groups 
biases the results in the direction of less mortality inequality.   
  We calculate several measures of life expectancy and mortality risk from the resulting 
mortality tables.  The results are summarized in Table 3.  They show that the bottom half has 
shorter life expectancies and lower survival rates than median income workers, and the top half 
has longer life expectancies and higher rates of survival.  In addition, the tables show that the 
projected differences in mortality are widening:  while the differential of the cohort life 
expectancy at age 20 between high income and low income men born in 1915 was 0.58 years, it 
is projected to grow to 4.4 years for the 1939 cohort.  Differentials are smaller for women (by 
construction) and have the same increasing pattern. 
  We believe that the income specific mortality information of Waldron and Cristia is 
superior to previous estimates.  Still, the data are limited.  Rather than analyzing the mortality 
differences between those in the top and bottom halves of the lifetime earnings distributions, we 
would have liked to have the information by lifetime income decile so that we could examine the 
mortality experience of the genuinely poor vs. those at other parts of the distribution.  It seems 
likely that the extent of mortality inequality is even greater than reflected in the top half/bottom 
half analysis.
  6 3.2  Earnings 




th percentiles as well as for a large sample of actual earnings histories.  The 
earnings data we use are based on the Benefits and Earnings Public-Use File, 2004.  This data 
source contains earnings histories and other administrative data for a one percent random sample 
of Social Security beneficiaries in December 2004.  Because Social Security did not record 
annual earnings until 1951 but did record aggregated earnings over the period 1937-1950, we 
omit individuals who had nonzero earnings prior to 1951 so that our final sample contains 
complete earnings histories.  We also limit the sample to those individuals who are receiving 
Social Security retirement benefits based on their own earnings history, as the data do not 
contain any way to link married couples.  The remaining sample contains 125,829 observations. 
  We develop earnings to match the cohorts for whom we have estimates of differential 
mortality.  The youngest cohort we are interested in computing measures of progressivity for is 
the cohort born in 1936-1939.  We pool the cohorts in the Benefits and Earnings Public-Use file 
born in these years (33,632 men and 20,429 women), and calculate each individual’s average 
non-zero earnings from age 45 to 55, denoted by  55 45− EARN .  This figure is used to classify 
earners into the bottom half and the top half of the earnings distribution, consistent with Waldron 
(2007).  The classification is done separately by year of birth and by gender.  In our subsequent 
analysis under the assumption of differential mortality, the individuals classified into the “top 
half” category are assumed to experience mortality rates developed for the top half of the 
earnings distribution, and individuals classified into the “bottom half” category are assumed to 
experience the less favorable mortality rates developed for the bottom half of the earnings 
distribution.  The mortality rates are based on Waldron (2007) as described previously. 
  7  After individuals are classified into these two earnings groups, we generate six stylized 
earnings histories: for the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentile male worker as determined by 
55 45− EARN , and a similar set for women.  To construct earnings histories for earlier cohorts, we 
scale back earnings appropriately using Social Security’s average wage index.
1   
  The earnings profiles for the stylized workers for the 1936-1939 birth cohorts are shown 
in Figure 1.  The earnings are reported in nominal dollars in the year they were earned.  The 
stylized workers at the 75
th percentile experience the steepest increases by age.  The last year of 
earnings observed in the data is 2003, and we assume that 2003 marks the final year of work for 
this sample. 
 
4.  Measures of Progressivity 
  We derive measures of the progressivity of Social Security for both the stylized earnings 
profiles described in the previous section, as well as the sample of earnings histories used to 
generate the stylized profiles.  First, we calculate each worker’s Social Security benefits under 
current law using the worker’s whole series of earnings.  Each year of earnings is first indexed 
forward to age 60 of the worker using Social Security’s average wage index series.  From these 
indexed earnings, the highest 35 values are then added up and divided by 420 to arrive at the 
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, or AIME.  The AIME includes zeroes if an individual 
worked less than 35 years.   
  Next we determine each individual’s Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) by using the 
current (2008) nonlinear PIA formula which encompasses the progressivity in the Social Security 
system.  For retirees turning 62 in 2008, the PIA is equal to 90 percent of the first $711 of  
                                                 
1 This method is used instead of generating each cohort’s earnings histories directly from the sample because of the 
lack of annual earnings data from 1937-1950. 
  8AIME, plus 32 percent of AIME above $711 and less than $4,288, plus 15 percent of AIME 
above $4,288.  For retirees in earlier cohorts, the thresholds (commonly referred to as bend 
points) are adjusted with the average wage index.  Through this formula, workers with lower 
levels of AIME receive higher replacement rates from Social Security.  The full PIA is payable 
to workers who retire at the designated normal retirement age for his or her cohort.  The PIA is 
paid as an inflation-indexed life annuity, which ends at death.  We assume the worker claims 
benefits at his or her normal retirement age, and the stream of benefits represents the cash 
outflows from the program. 
  The Social Security payroll tax is 12.4 percent, paid equally by the employee and the 
employer; however, it is commonly assumed that the employee bears the full amount of this tax.  
The portion used to fund retirement and survivor benefits is 10.6 percent, and the remaining 1.8 
percent is used to fund disability benefits.  We therefore use 10.6 percent of earnings in each 
year to represent the cash inflows to the program corresponding to the Social Security retirement 
benefits calculated for each worker.   
  We convert these nominal cash flows to real cash flows using the CPI, and finally adjust 
the stream of cash flows for mortality using the tables described in the previous section.  Each set 
of cash flows is subject to two different sets of mortality assumptions.  Under homogenous 
mortality, all cash flows are adjusted using population-average mortality appropriate for the 
worker’s birth cohort.  Under differential mortality, all cash flows are adjusted using the income-
specific mortality table applicable to the worker.  For the stylized workers, the 25
th percentile 
worker is the median of the bottom half and is therefore assumed to experience the mortality 
rates constructed for the bottom half.  Similarly, the 75
th percentile worker is assigned top half 
mortality, and the median worker uses the average mortality rates of the population.  For the 
  9actual worker’s earnings histories, we classify workers by calculating  55 45− EARN  and apply top 
half mortality to those with  55 45− EARN  above the median and bottom half mortality to those with 
55 45− EARN  below the median. 
  Under both sets of mortality assumptions, we present two measures of Social Security 
progressivity:  the internal rate of return (IRR), and the net present value (NPV).  The IRR is the 
rate of return that equates cash inflows to cash outflows.  We compute the IRRs of the expected 
cash flows from Social Security (described above).  Thus, our IRR measure can be interpreted as 
the return earned in the aggregate by individuals with the same earnings history within a 
particular cohort.
2  A rate of return of 2 percent indicates that Social Security is a comparable 
investment to a safe investment that earns 2 percent each year.  The NPV is simply the 
discounted present value of all expected cash inflows and outflows, calculated using a safe real 
rate of return of 2 percent.  The NPV is reported in constant 2008 dollars. 
  It is important to emphasize that we are not calculating the rates of return to Social 
Security actually experienced by people born in 1915, 1923, 1931 and 1938.  Rather what we are 
analyzing is how they would have done if the 2008 structure of Social Security (adjusted 
backwards for changes in average wages) had been in effect for their entire lifetimes. 
By assuming workers in all cohorts receive benefits based on current law, we are ignoring the 
large start-up gains that older cohorts received because of the growth of Social Security in the 
1950s and 1960s and its pay-as-you-go nature.  This assumption allows us to isolate the changes 
in progressivity due solely to changes in mortality and mortality inequality.  In reality, older 
                                                 
2 Because IRR is nonlinear, this is different from the expected IRR earned by an individual with that earnings 
profile.  To find the expected IRR for an individual, we would have to compute the IRRs conditional on survival to 
every possible age, and then calculate the expected value using the relevant mortality profile.  The difficulty in 
performing this calculation is that if the individual dies before reaching retirement age, the IRR is negative infinity.  
This distinction is not important for our other measure, the net present value (NPV).  Because NPV is linear, the 
NPV for a group in the aggregate is the same as the expected NPV for a member of the group. 
  10cohorts earned far higher internal rates of return as they paid Social Security taxes during times 
of relatively low tax rates, but received benefits based on more generous benefit formulas. 
 
5.  Results 
  We begin by computing internal rates of return and net present values (as described 
above) for our stylized workers.  These results are shown in Table 4.  In each case the 
“unadjusted” column contains the results obtained using homogeneous mortality.  The “adjusted” 
columns use differential mortality.  That is, we use the mortality profile of the bottom half for the 
25
th percentile, the mortality profile of the top half for the 75
th percentile, and the average 
mortality profile for the 50
th percentile.   
Overall, women experience higher IRRs and NPVs compared to men because of their 
longer life expectancies.  Men at all income levels have IRRs that are below the 2 percent that 
would be obtained from a safe investment; correspondingly, their NPVs are always negative.  In 
all cohorts, women at the median income and below obtain IRRs that are above 2 percent (and 
positive NPVs).  In the 1915 and 1923 cohorts, women at the 75
th percentile obtain IRRs that are 
below 2 percent (and negative NPVs); in later cohorts, these high-income women also obtain 
IRRs that are above 2%.  In general, for both men and women, later cohorts experience higher 
IRRs and NPVs than earlier ones.  This is attributable to increases in life expectancy for these 
later cohorts.   
For the 1915 cohort, differential mortality makes virtually no difference to the IRRs 
earned by women, and a relatively small difference to the IRRs earned by men (it lowers the IRR 
by 0.21 percentage points for low-income men, and raises it by 0.24 percentage points for high-
income men).  The changes in the NPVs for women are in the $100-200 range (with the NPV of 
  11the 25
th percentile falling, and the NPV of the 75
th percentile rising), while the changes in the 
NPVs for men are in the $1,000-2,000 range.  For younger cohorts, however, differential 
mortality has a progressively larger effect, reflecting the fact that mortality inequality is much 
larger for the younger cohorts.  For example, in the 1938 cohort, differential mortality reduces 
the IRR from 1.51 percent to 1.07 percent for low income men, and raises it from 0.75 percent to 
1.28 percent for high-income men.  In fact, once differential mortality is taken into account, 
males in the 75
th percentile in the two later cohorts receive higher rates of return than males in 
the 25
th percentile.  At least in terms of rates of return, an apparently progressive system 
becomes regressive.  For men in earlier cohorts, and for women in all the cohorts, Social 
Security remains progressive, although the progressivity is reduced when differential mortality is 
taken into account. 
Our results for stylized workers are comparable to those reported in Garrett (1995), who 
computes IRRs and NPVs for stylized men, women, and couples in the 1925 birth cohort at 
different income levels.  There are a few significant differences between Garrett’s computation 
and ours.  As discussed in the literature review, Garrett uses mortality differentials based on 
current income that were estimated in the 1960s and 1970s in Kitagawa and Hauser (1973).  
Garrett also does not adjust for age in computing wage profiles – for example, in each year, a 
50
th percentile worker earns the income of the median family.  (However, he reports in a footnote 
that adjusting for age does not change his results substantially.)   Finally, Garrett allows 
mortality to vary according to whether a worker is in the bottom quintile, or the top four 
quintiles.  Thus, differential mortality lowers the IRRs for the 20
th percentile and below, and 
raises the IRRs for all others.  Moving from homogeneous to differential mortality reduces the 
IRR earned by 20
th percentile males from 1.62 percent to 0.47 percent, raises the IRR earned by 
  12the 50
th percentile male from 0.85 percent to 1.06 percent, and raises the IRR earned by the 75
th 
percentile male from 0.53 percent to 0.74 percent.  Thus, differential mortality makes Social 
Security regressive.  Our comparable results for the 1923 cohort are somewhat more modest.  
After adjusting for differential mortality, the 25
th percentile male still earns the highest IRR.  
While the 75
th percentile male earns a slightly higher return than the 50
th percentile male, the 
difference is small.  This is probably because the correlation between lifetime income and 
mortality is weaker than the correlation between current income and mortality (which is 
confounded by reverse causality).   
Our next step is to compute IRRs and NPVs for the actual workers in our sample of 
Social Security beneficiaries.  These results are summarized in Figures 2-5.  Figures 2 and 3 
show the average IRRs for men and women respectively for different levels of AIME (where the 
AIME for each cohort is given in current dollars for the year that workers in that cohort turned 
60).  Averages are calculated over $100 intervals.  The two series labeled “homogeneous” and 
“differential” show the average IRR earned by workers at each level of AIME under the 
assumptions of homogeneous and differential mortality respectively.  The two straight lines on 
the graphs represent linear approximations of these average IRR curves. 
Under differential mortality, a worker’s mortality profile depends only on whether he or 
she is in the top half or bottom half of the lifetime earnings distribution.  As discussed above, we 
classify workers into the top half and bottom half of the earnings distribution based on their 
nonzero earnings between the ages of 45 and 55 – this classification was chosen to be consistent 
with Waldron (2007).  This measure of lifetime income appears to be highly correlated with 
AIME and therefore creates a break in the “differential” line at roughly the 50
th percentile of 
AIME – workers below the 50
th percentile see a decline in their IRR, while workers above the 
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th percentile see an increase in their IRR.  As a result, the average IRR initially falls with 
AIME, then rises briefly, and falls again.  It is likely that, had differential mortality data been 
available for finer income groups, mortality inequality would affect the average IRR in a more 
continuous way. 
These results are consistent with the results for the stylized workers.  Across cohorts, all 
but the lowest income men earn IRRs that are below 2 percent.  At each level of AIME, women 
earn higher IRRs than men, and more recent cohorts earn higher IRRs than earlier ones.  
Differential mortality makes virtually no difference for women in the earlier cohorts, and only a 
small difference for men.  For more recent cohorts, differential mortality makes a substantial 
difference for men, and a modest difference for women.   
  Figures 4 and 5 show the NPVs for men and women respectively at different levels of 
AIME.  Again, the “homogeneous” and “differential” series show the average NPVs for all 
workers at each level of AIME, while the other two lines are linear approximations.  Men at most 
income levels receive negative NPVs, while lower-income women generally receive positive 
NPVs.  NPVs at all income levels are higher for later cohorts.  Again, the impact of differential 
mortality is pronounced for men in later cohorts.  For instance, note in the fourth panel of Figure 
4 that men born in 1938 with an AIME of $3,500 have a higher (albeit negative) NPV from 
Social Security than do men in the same cohort with an AIME of $2,000.  Once again, at least in 
income ranges, the program has turned regressive.  The impact on differential mortality on 




  146.   Conclusion 
  Social Security is the largest program of the federal government and is thought to be 
progressive in that it offers workers with low lifetime earnings a better deal than those with high 
lifetime earnings.   The mechanism to achieve this progressivity is the highly nonlinear benefit 
(PIA) formula.  In this paper, we incorporate the latest evidence on mortality differences of those 
with above average and below average lifetime earnings.  Since Social Security retirement 
benefits are paid out in the form of inflation indexed life annuities, differential mortality and 
therefore life expectancies have the potential to reverse the progressive impact of the PIA 
formula. 
  The Waldron and Cristia studies published in 2007 indicate that there is more mortality 
inequality for men than for women and that the level of mortality inequality grew from birth 
cohort to birth cohort between those born in 1912-15 and those born between 1936-38.   For 
example, the extra life expectancy at age 60 of men in the top half of the earnings distribution 
relative to those in the bottom half grew from 1.35 years for the 1915 birth cohort to 3.67 for the 
1939 cohort.  The extra lifetime for women in the top half of the earnings distribution relative to 
those in bottom half grew from nil in the 1915 birth cohort to 2.79 years in the 1939 cohort. 
   The growing mortality inequality has the straightforward effect of reducing the 
progressivity of Social Security.  By the 1931 and 1939 birth cohorts, it is no longer true that 
Social Security offers a better deal for those in the 25
th percentile of the earnings distribution 
than those in the 75
th percentile, at least in terms of rates of return.  For women, the system has 
remained progressive, but much less so than if mortality inequality is ignored. 
  There is considerable room for further research on mortality inequality.  For instance, it 
would have been useful to have a finer gradation of income categories and it would be interesting 
  15to know something about mortality inequality among younger cohorts such as the baby-boomers.  
Social Security has the data for such studies, but it is not readily available in public use files.  We 
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  17Table 1: Mortality of bottom half relative to top half of lifetime income distribution (males) 
 Age 
Year  of  birth  60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 
1912–1915  1.27  1.24 1.20 1.13 1.09  0.94
1916–1919  1.51  1.36 1.34 1.20 1.05  0.90
1920–1923  1.50  1.40 1.34 1.31 1.22  1.07
1924–1927  1.51  1.53 1.48 1.40 1.31  1.16
1928–1931  1.71  1.61 1.57 1.49 1.39  1.24
1932–1935  1.75  1.73 1.69 1.61 1.51  1.36
1936–1938  1.84  1.78 1.73 1.65 1.56  1.41
 
 
Table 2: Mortality of bottom half relative to top half of lifetime income distribution (females) 
 Age 
Year  of  birth  60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 
1912–1915 1.13  1.10 1.07 1.00 0.97  0.84
1916–1919 1.34  1.21 1.19 1.07 0.93  0.80
1920–1923 1.33  1.24 1.19 1.16 1.08  0.95
1924–1927 1.34  1.36 1.32 1.24 1.16  1.03
1928–1931 1.52  1.43 1.39 1.32 1.24  1.10
1932–1935 1.56  1.54 1.50 1.43 1.34  1.21
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Cohort Life Expectancy at Age 20 














1915  52.25  50.91 49.65  57.93 57.63 57.35 
1923  54.86  52.55 50.48  59.94 58.87 57.84 
1931  57.34  54.18 51.49  61.61 59.79 58.11 
1939  59.35  55.65 52.63  63.06 60.72 58.67 
           
Cohort Life Expectancy at Age 60 














1915  18.95  18.26 17.60  22.99 23.00 23.03 
1923  20.56  19.28 18.13  23.78 23.25 22.73 
1931  22.16  20.22 18.59  24.74 23.56 22.49 
1939  23.58  21.89 19.91  25.72 24.03 22.58 
           
Cohort Life Expectancy at Age 65 














1915  15.72  15.20 14.70  19.13 19.21 19.32 
1923  17.07  16.05 15.13  19.80 19.41 19.04 
1931  18.47  16.83 15.45  20.65 19.66 18.75 
1939  19.69  18.25 16.52  21.56 20.05 18.77 
           
Probability of Survival to Age 65 Conditional on Survival 
to Age 20 














1915  0.708  0.676 0.645  0.817 0.807 0.796 
1923  0.762  0.712 0.665  0.853 0.831 0.809 
1931  0.805  0.745 0.689  0.878 0.848 0.820 
1939  0.838  0.791 0.738  0.896 0.865 0.835 
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Table 4: Results for Stylized Workers 
  Internal Rate of Return 
Net Present Value 
 (at age 20, 2008 dollars) 
1915 Unadjusted Adjusted Difference Unadjusted Adjusted  Difference 
Female 25th  3.09% 3.06%  -0.02%  4,283.05 4,179.22 -103.82
Female 50th  2.09% 2.09%      692.89 692.89 
Female 75th  1.24% 1.26% 0.02%  -9,083.35 -8,897.23  186.12
Male 25th  0.35% 0.14%  -0.21%  -17,602.32 -18,967.45  -1,365.13
Male 50th  -0.53% -0.53%      -39,099.20 -39,099.20 
Male 75th  -0.99% -0.75% 0.24% -56,917.35 -54,783.07 2,134.29
1923 Unadjusted Adjusted Difference Unadjusted Adjusted  Difference 
Female 25th  3.77% 3.64%  -0.13%  8,826.74 7,936.54 -890.21
Female 50th  2.64% 2.64%      6,313.99 6,313.99 
Female 75th  1.86% 2.00% 0.13%  -1,984.42 -63.21  1,921.21
Male 25th  1.03% 0.71%  -0.33%  -12,629.79 -15,707.69  -3,077.90
Male 50th  0.29% 0.29%      -32,843.89 -32,843.89 
Male 75th  -0.05% 0.33% 0.38% -48,684.20 -42,905.36 5,778.84
1931 Unadjusted Adjusted Difference Unadjusted Adjusted  Difference 
Female 25th  4.01% 3.79%  -0.22% 11,287.51 9,493.64  -1,793.87
Female 50th  2.81% 2.81%      8,773.85 8,773.85 
Female 75th  2.06% 2.30% 0.24%  967.94 5,105.37  4,137.43
Male 25th  1.19% 0.78%  -0.42%  -12,334.26 -17,010.02  -4,675.75
Male 50th  0.58% 0.58%      -31,813.90 -31,813.90 
Male 75th  0.33% 0.81% 0.49%  -46,426.82 -36,513.17  9,913.65
1938 Unadjusted Adjusted Difference Unadjusted Adjusted  Difference 
Female 25th  4.41% 4.14%  -0.27% 15,994.82 13,224.33  -2,770.49
Female 50th  3.15% 3.15%      14,632.08 14,632.08 
Female 75th  2.41% 2.71% 0.30%  7,805.31 14,528.04  6,722.73
Male 25
th 1.51% 1.07%  -0.44% -9,156.76 -15,636.60  -6,479.83
Male 50
th 1.00% 1.00%      -27,309.54 -27,309.54 
Male 75
th 0.75% 1.28% 0.53%  -41,733.36 -27,131.87  14,601.48
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